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Uncovering the neural correlates and evolutionary drivers of behavioral and cognitive traits 
has been held back by traditional perspectives on which correlations to look for—in particular, 
anthropocentric conceptions of cognition and coarse-grained brain measurements. We welcome 
our colleagues’ comments on our overview of the field and their suggestions for how to move 
forward. Here, we counter, clarify, and extend some points, focusing on the merits of looking 
for the “best” predictor of cognitive ability, the sources and meaning of “noise,” and the ways in 
which we can deduce and test meaningful conclusions from comparative analyses of complex traits. 
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Response
With some notable exceptions, the study of brain–
behavior relationships in a comparative, phylogenetic 
context has been marked by (a) anthropocentrism 
regarding which behaviors are regarded as important; 
(b) a focus on coarse-grained neuroanatomical traits, 
most notably brain size; and (c) a reliance on somewhat 
slippery notions with contentious definitions like “intel-
ligence” and “cognition.” In our review (Logan et al., 
2018), we highlight that brains and behavior are vari-
able, both within species and across taxa. This hetero-
geneity undermines the use of coarse-grained, anthro-
pocentric measures. Instead, we argue that correlations 
between neural and behavioral traits in cross-taxa 
contexts should be tackled using a two-pronged strat-
egy that combines the power of comparative analyses to 
detect generalizable evolutionary trends, with the depth 
of understanding provided by detailed studies of ecolog-
ically relevant traits in particular species.
Herculano-Houzel (2018) and Serpico and Frasnelli 
(2018) provide thoughtful commentaries that push our 
arguments in differing directions. First, Herculano-
Houzel (2018) emphasizes the importance of structural 
variation among brains of different species, particu-
larly in neural number, but questions the two-pronged 
approach we recommend. Second, Serpico and Frasnelli 
suggest that we may have been too hasty in dismissing 
coarse-grained, anthropocentric measures and present 
a case study in which they argue that such measures are 
successful. In this response, we wish to emphasize a few 
points of difference in opinion, clarify our view, and 
extend the new ideas the commentators have raised.
The studies that interest us establish and explore 
correlations between neural properties, on one hand, 
and behavioral or cognitive traits, on the other. We 
argue that to properly understand their relationships 
and dependencies, both sides should be considered 
in finer grained detail. The black box of “brain size” 
should be opened up to more specific brain structures 
and neuronal measures, and behavior should be ecolog-
ically meaningful and quantifiable. Herculano-Houzel 
(2018) focuses on the former point, providing a lucid 
description of the importance of neuron number. Her 
view is informed by what she calls “embrained cogni-
tive evolution” (p. 93): the idea that cognitive evolution 
should be understood in light of within-brain neural 
structures. She contrasts embrained cognitive evolu-
tion with “embodied cognition,” the idea that if we are 
to truly understand cognition we must not restrict our 
notions of cognition or investigations of cognitive opera-
tions to the vault of the skull. Where the latter asks us to 
extend cognition to include bodily processes, the former 
asks us to understand cognitive evolution in terms of 
internal neural processes. 
We wholly agree that embrained cognition is an 
improvement from focusing on whole brain size or 
volume. After all, neurons and their synaptic connections 
play a critical role in producing behavioral phenotypes. 
We do want to note two points of difference, however. 
First, Herculano-Houzel (2018) suggests that neuronal 
number is the best correlate on which to focus, where 
we recommend a plurality of within-brain correlates. 
Second, our view is not simply embrained cognition: We 
also emphasize ecological and phylogenetic context.  
For Herculano-Houzel (2018), cortical neuron 
number is “the best predictor of quantitative differences 
in cognitive performance across species” (p. 92), imply-
ing that it should have priority over other measures. 
Our view goes beyond choosing one brain measure as 
a one-size-fits-all variable because we see this approach 
as making unvalidated assumptions about both the 
proximate and ultimate basis of behavioral evolu-
tion (Logan et al., 2018). The “cognitive performance” 
to which Herculano-Houzel refers comes from inter-
specific studies of “self-control” (Herculano-Houzel, 
2017; data from MacLean et al., 2014). In our review, 
we argue that such proxies of cognition are unsuitable 
for intra- and interspecific correlations (Tables 1 and 2, 
Logan et al., 2018). Further, despite noting that “cere-
bral and cerebellar cortices gain neurons in tandem 
across mammalian species” (p. 92), which implies they 
are functionally interdependent and may both contrib-
ute to cognitive evolution (see also Barton, 2012; Barton 
& Venditti, 2014), the analysis performed in Herculano-
Houzel (2017) does not account for this potential inter-
dependence. Moreover, we have argued that the pursuit 
of the “best” predictor of cognition is itself a mistaken 
endeavor. Behavior is complex and heterogenous, and as 
such we may expect a range of variables to contribute to 
different aspects of behavioral evolution. Treating traits 
as “predictor” variables implies a strategy for trying to 
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deduce cognitive ability from another, more easily quan-
tifiable trait (i.e., using neural number to infer cogni-
tive capacity). We worry that such a strategy is entan-
gled with our desire to rank animals by their cognitive 
prowess, typically with human performance as the stick 
against which all others are measured. It certainly does 
not follow from this that neural number–behavioral 
correlations (or other correlations) are uninformative, 
but rather that we should be cautious of this strategy 
falling into anthropocentrism. Approaching behavioral 
and cognitive traits from an ecological and phylogenetic 
perspective, we hope, guards against this.
Herculano-Houzel (2018) suggests that we imply 
brain size remains a “legitimate” predictive variable and 
instead argues that it should be considered a descrip-
tive variable because body mass scales only with some 
organs, and brain size does not track neuron number 
in consistent ways across taxa. In our review, we argue 
that brain size should not be viewed as either a predic-
tive or a descriptive variable but as a variable pheno-
type. As evolutionary biologists, we should be interested 
in the proximate and ultimate causes of this variation. 
We describe how heterogeneity in brain structure and 
composition differentially effects brain size, and we 
argue that understanding how brains vary internally 
is an integral part of understanding brain size varia-
tion. The question follows naturally, What determines 
that internal variation? Answering this requires under-
standing both developmental aspects of brain evolution 
and the ultimate selection pressures shaping variation 
in specific brain components or networks. We do not 
believe the relatively crude analysis of total brain size 
and ill-defined behaviors provides an adequate shortcut 
to addressing these questions.
Herculano-Houzel (2018) contests our suggestion 
that brain size is a noisy trait and argues instead that 
it is easily measurable. However, Herculano-Houzel 
adopts a narrow view of what “noise” is. We defined 
noise as any feature that affects whether a measure-
ment is transferable outside of the context in which it 
was measured; that is, “noise” amounts to exogenous 
confounding effects (e.g., unvalidated proxies leave an 
open question of whether the behavior of interest was 
actually approximated; a measured behavior depends on 
the internal state of an individual and their perception 
of the environment, which are not accounted for in the 
behavioral measure; Currie & Walsh, 2018; Logan et al., 
2018). When we argue that brain size is noisy, we are 
not saying that it is difficult to isolate and thus measure, 
which is a distinct problem, but rather we are pointing 
to limitations on the ability of researchers to extrapo-
late from these measurements; such limitations arise 
from the exogenous confounding factors endemic in 
reasoning about complex, evolved systems. Herculano-
Houzel’s (2018) argument that the use of brain size as a 
predictor of cognition is problematic due to variation 
in neuronal density is therefore consistent with what we 
have in mind; we think both phenotypic heterogeneity 
and phylogenetic and ecological context are important 
sources of noise in studies of brain size. 
That aside, we do think brain size is more difficult to 
measure than appearance suggests: There is a non-negli-
gible degree of measurement error. For example, ceta-
cean species vary widely in the amount of “nonbrain” 
tissue found within the cranium, which introduces exten-
sive variability when comparing endocranial volume 
within cetaceans and across mammalian orders (Ridg-
way, Carlin, Van Alstyne, Hanson, & Tarpley, 2016). 
Ridgway and colleagues also described how the weight 
of a brain can change depending on how long it has 
been immersed in a fixative solution, which is rarely 
controlled across data sets. These, and other effects such 
as age and sex, are some of the ways that measurement 
error can occur and vary in interspecific databases of 
“average” brain size. Currently, large comparative data 
sets of brain size are often based on small numbers of 
individuals; therefore, the extent of these effects on the 
results of comparative analyses is unknown. 
Herculano-Houzel’s (2018) vision for the future of 
comparative studies of brains and cognition focuses 
on the emergence of new databases that systematically 
acquire information on brain composition across species, 
building on improved methodologies that balance preci-
sion and accuracy, particularly in the context of count-
ing neuron numbers. We would happily ascribe to this 
future, and we are excited about the potential of the 
field. However, we caution against allowing this kind 
of analysis to fall into the same old traps—particularly, 
expecting to find a single brain trait to be the “best” at 
predicting a behavioral or cognitive variable of interest. 
We again emphasize phylogenetic and ecological context 
(see also the "contextual null" in Mikhalevich 2015). 
We are interested in the kinds of behaviors that make 
ecological sense for the clade at hand, and the kinds of 
predictions we make about brain–behavior relation-
ships should emerge from that phylogenetic and ecolog-
ical context. We must also be open to the possibility that 
any relationships found may be specific to that context. 
As such, our approach involves testing the predictions, 
and understanding the functional basis, of correlations 
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derived from comparative studies within a target subset 
of species. Herculano-Houzel objects to this strategy, 
but she has misinterpreted our argument. She takes it 
that the two-pronged approach fails to consider scale: 
interspecies correlations are not invalidated because the 
correlations don’t hold within a species (p. 93). However, 
we did not necessarily intend for intra- and interspecific 
correlations to be compared, or for intraspecific studies 
to be a necessary validation of phylogenetic studies. We 
suggest in Figure 3 (Logan et al., 2018) that we should 
use the conclusions drawn from interspecific correlations 
to generate hypotheses that can be tested within a subset 
of species, potentially including pairs of phenotypically 
divergent species, where fine-grained detail can be added 
to the coarse level of analyses performed in compara-
tive studies. Contrary to Herculano-Houzel’s claim 
that this would require focusing on lower quantitative 
levels of phenotypic variation, we suggest that the opti-
mal approach would be to target a subset of species that 
capture the phenotypic or ecological range sampled by 
a broader comparative analysis. This two-pronged strat-
egy merely reflects a pragmatic trade-off between limi-
tations on the level of functional and behavioral detail 
that can be collected for each species and the number of 
species that can be studied. 
We would, however, not exclude intraspecific 
studies of phenotypic variables from this approach. 
 Herculano-Houzel (2018) reminds us that “brains are 
self-organizing systems that assimilate their environ-
mental and life histories into their structure and func-
tion” (p. 93), which may obscure genuine associations 
between neural and behavioral traits in intraspecific 
analyses. We acknowledge that plasticity is a key compo-
nent of neural and behavioral development. However, 
phylogenetic correlations stem from selection acting on 
individuals within populations over time. For traits to 
coevolve across phylogenies, selection must have acted 
on intraspecific variation at some time in the past; there-
fore, intraspecific variation in a neural phenotype must 
be at least partially heritable and have had a fitness/
behavioral effect in some ecological context that relates 
to the results of the interspecific comparisons. Identify-
ing that context in extant populations seems like a legiti-
mate way to follow up on interspecific correlations. But 
we agree with Herculano-Houzel that failing to find the 
same interspecific correlations at the intraspecific level 
does not invalidate the interspecific correlations, in part 
because the selection pressures and variation in extant 
populations does not need to be consistent with histori-
cal trends. We would also point out that environmental 
effects contribute to interspecific variation as well, 
and may themselves vary over time. This is perhaps a 
further reason why we should strive to follow up coarse-
level phylogenetic analyses with more in-depth study in 
targeted species. Our point is that we should not be satis-
fied with simple brain–behavior correlations; we should 
aim to understand the complex relationship between 
brains, behavior, and ecology in detail. 
In their commentary, Serpico and Frasnelli (2018) 
argue that the traditional approach (e.g., coarse-grained 
brain measurements, anthropocentric behavioral traits) 
can be successful in some contexts. A great virtue of 
their argument is a shift from considering whether one 
approach is better generally, to asking how to iden-
tify the contexts in which we should expect particular 
approaches to be suitable or not; building a picture of 
such expectations fits well with our “no one-size-fits all” 
approach to brain–behavior correlations.
Serpico and Frasnelli (2018) present the study of 
brain lateralization as a vindication of the traditional 
approach. They argue that even though lateralization 
presents differently across animals, there are nonethe-
less quite general things to say about asymmetries in 
brain function at broad phylogenetic levels. We suspect 
that, rather than revealing the merits of coarse-grained 
anthropocentric measures, this example potentially 
demonstrates the merits of combining broad compara-
tive studies with detailed, fine-grained understandings 
of selected species. The knowledge of lateralization that 
Serpico and Frasnelli present comes from a functional 
(“bottom-up”) approach that has generated extensive 
amounts of data from targeted species that display later-
alization (see Rogers, Vallortigara, & Andrew, 2013, for 
examples). This not only resulted in the conclusion that 
lateralization is a common trait across many taxonomic 
groups, as opposed to being a human-specific adapta-
tion, but also revealed more about the cellular basis of 
brain lateralization and its behavioral relevance. To us, 
this seems like a good example of how the bottom-up 
approach can build depth into our understanding of a 
trait whose variation had initially been investigated in 
coarse detail across broader taxonomic levels. 
We argued that understanding both the proximate 
and ultimate basis of behavioral evolution requires 
avoiding anthropocentric approaches in favor of framing 
arguments around the ecological context of the species 
under study (Logan et al. 2018). Serpico and Frasnelli 
(2018) view the study of lateralization as a counterex-
ample. We are neither experts nor historians of later-
alization, but our impression is that much of this field 
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was initially driven by a desire to understand variation 
in lateralization in humans. As such, “success” in this 
context intrinsically relates to an anthropocentric aim. 
Nevertheless, as Serpico and Frasnelli note, even though 
lateralization has subsequently been observed in many 
lineages, we still do not understand whether this repre-
sents repeated independent innovations to a similar 
problem or whether lateralization inherently arises in 
all brains, a question we argue could be better addressed 
by switching to further fine-grained studies in multiple 
lineages. Finally, although lateralization is not itself 
a behavior or a cognitive ability, there are potentially 
ecological contexts in which behavioral variation due to 
lateralization has significant fitness effects. Understand-
ing these contexts across species would link the study of 
neural traits, behaviors, and fitness in this example and 
help elucidate the evolution of the trait of interest. 
We are optimistic about our ability to uncover the 
proximate basis, ecological context, and selective pres-
sures shaping animal behavior and cognition. The field 
is already progressing at pace via a combination of novel 
methods of phenotyping behavior and new tools for 
identifying the genetic and neural variation underpin-
ning behavioral variation. To make the most of these 
advances, it is time to set aside dated concepts about 
what brain size means and what cognition is. We should 
be explicit about assumptions in the field and set out 
to design ways to test and improve upon those assump-
tions. When properly applied and contextualized, the 
combination of detailed bottom-up studies with the 
potential for a phylogenetic “top-down” approach to test 
the generality of brain–behavior associations is a power-
ful route toward understanding brain–behavior relation-
ships in ecologically relevant contexts.
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